FinCEN依第9714条发布行政命令，切断MEXC与美国金融系统联系 美东时间 11 月 6 日，美国财政部金融犯罪执法网络（FinCEN）发布命令，禁止美国金融机构参与任何与MEXC Global（下称MEXC）之间的资金往来。该命令依据《打击俄罗斯洗钱法》第 9714(a) 条发布，认定MEXC是一家在美国境外运营的、与俄罗斯非法金融活动有关的一级洗钱关注金融机构。
https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-11/MEXC-Section-9714.pdf
一、本次行动的法律依据：《打击俄罗斯洗钱法》第 9714 条
本次命令是 FinCEN 依据《打击俄罗斯洗钱法》第 9714 (a) 条出具的行政命令（Order），属于一类特殊反洗钱 “特殊措施”，区别于爱国者法案 311 条款。
FinCEN 第 9714 条命令与 OFAC 指定是两种不同的工具。前者针对美国境外金融机构，义务主体是美国境内金融机构，措施为禁止办理相关资金传输，违反后果是违反BSA相关要求，且未设终止日但可豁免；后者针对特定实体，义务主体是美国人及受美国管辖的资产，措施为冻结在美资产、禁止美国人交易，违反后果涉及民事与刑事责任，并设有除名程序。两者的核心区别在于第 9714 条命令调整的是美国机构的行为边界，而OFAC指定调整的是被列名实体的法律地位。
FinCEN 第 9714 条命令触发前提为财长认定境外金融机构构成与俄罗斯非法金融相关的一级洗钱风险，可对境外金融机构采取以下两类措施：
- 沿用爱国者法案 311 项下 5 项传统措施：额外的记录与报告、实质受益人的信息收集、特定可转让账户的客户识别、特定代理行的客户识别、禁止或限制代理行或过度账户）或；
- 禁止美国受管辖金融机构与该机构发生资金划转（含可兑换虚拟资产货币，Convertible Virtual Currency）
- "Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act (Pub. L. 116-283), as amended by section 6106(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Pub. L. 117-81) (section 9714),2 provides, in relevant part, that, if the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) “determines that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that one or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States ... is of primary money laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance,” the Secretary may, “by order, regulation, or otherwise as permitted by law”:
- (1) require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take one or more of the special measures described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b); or
- (2) prohibit, or impose conditions upon, certain transmittals of funds (as defined by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency (collectively, covered financial institutions), if such transmittal of funds involves any such financial institution. The authority of the Secretary to administer both section 9714 and the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) has been delegated to FinCEN."
- 在本次命令文件中，FinCEN 明确表示5项特别措施不足以应对 MEXC带来的风险，其中增加记账、报告义务只能事后记录，MEXC相关非法资金仍然可以流转，无法切断风险传导进入美国金融体系，而禁止美国代理行账户只能阻断直接代理行关系，MEXC仍然可能通过第三国金融机构间接接入美元体系。
- "None of the special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 5318A—special measures one through five—would effectively address the illicit finance threat posed by MEXC Global. Any additional recordkeeping, information collection, or reporting requirements, as described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(1)-(4), would be insufficient to guard against the risks posed by covered financial institutions processing transmittals of funds involving MEXC Global. Those special measures would allow such transfers to continue to the benefit of illicit actors connected to Russian illicit finance, as well as Iran-related and other illicit financial activity. Further, merely prohibiting and/or placing conditions upon the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of MEXC Global, as described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(5), would be similarly inadequate. Neither prohibiting nor imposing conditions on such accounts would safeguard the U.S. financial system to the same degree as prohibiting transmittals of funds, as such a special measure would not address the movement of funds outside of a strict correspondent or payable-through relationship..."
- 因此，FinCEN 采取了禁止资金传输这一措施，直接切断美国金融机构和 MEXC 相关的资金通道。依据《打击俄罗斯洗钱法》第 9714(a) 条，FinCEN可直接发布命令生效，生效时间为《联邦公报》刊登后30 天后，命令无自动到期终止日期，FinCEN 保留豁免、修改条件的权限。目前，Beosin KYT已将MEXC相关地址标记为special measure（非制裁），后续会根据情况进行更为细致的标签分类。
二、 FinCEN认定的非法资金流转事实
在命令正文中，FinCEN认定在2021年5月至 2026年5月期间，MEXC Global 为与俄罗斯非法金融活动及其他非法活动（包括制裁规避和网络犯罪）相关的 167 亿美元资金流动提供了便利，对美国金融体系构成重大威胁。
文件中并没有将 167 亿美元拆分为详细清单，而是列举了四大非法资金流转场景及具体案例的资金规模：
(1) 与俄罗斯非法金融活动密切相关
- 和被欧美制裁俄罗斯加密平台 Garantex、Grinex 直接交易，合计约 1.33 亿美元，交易持续至 2026 年 6 月；
- 与 A7 网络有交易往来，为A7 Network 的至少 2,600 万美元资金传输提供了便利，并发送或接收了与 A7A5 这种卢布稳定币相关的近 2 亿美元。
- 与多家无 KYC 的俄罗斯高风险交易所有交易往来，且为涉及俄罗斯暗网市场的 850 万美元交易提供了便利
- (2) 为伊朗及其代理人交易提供便利
- 近 20 亿美元涉伊朗相关流转，其中超 10 亿直接对接伊朗加密交易所；涉及伊朗央行、伊斯兰革命卫队圣城旅，还包括哈马斯下属卡桑旅等恐怖关联主体。
- (3) 为涉及朝鲜（DPRK）金融协助者的交易提供便利
- 处理 OFAC 制裁的朝鲜洗钱人员 Sim Hyon Sop 的资金，即便该地址已经被公开标记制裁，平台仍完成约 35 万美元资金接收。
- (4) 为网络犯罪、勒索软件相关交易提供便利
- 2021‑2026 合计近 19.9 亿美元网络犯罪资金流经平台；2022‑2024 接收超 3790 万美元勒索软件付款，涉及 125 种以上勒索软件变种。
三、禁令核心内容
禁令原文为A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in any transmittal of funds from or to MEXC Global，即受管制的美国境内金融机构，不得处理任何从 MEXC 发出或向其发出的资金传输。
● 受管制的金融机构（Covered Financial Institution）：美国《银行保密法BSA》定义下全部美国境内金融机构，银行、支付机构、美国本土加密货币服务商等。
● 禁止行为：禁止向 MEXC 转出资金和接收来自 MEXC 的资金，包含法币、加密货币。
● 技术现实考量：区块链交易一旦发出，接收方无法在链上“拒绝”入账。FinCEN特别说明如果美国机构被动收到 MEXC 发出的加密货币，技术上无法退回时，可根据具体情况自行裁量并遵守本命令：例如资金虽源自 MEXC ，但已在非托管钱包中长时间存放；机构的风险缓释程序无法将资金退回 MEXC 。
" In providing for the rejection of CVC under certain limited circumstances, FinCEN acknowledges that, at this time, there are technological limitations that may limit or preclude covered financial institutions from declining CVC transfers originating at addresses outside of their control, and compliant institutions may find themselves in receipt of CVC from MEXC Global despite a desire and effort to limit such exposure.50 This order therefore allows covered financial institutions the flexibility to act with discretion based on the facts and circumstances of a particular transaction and comply with this order, even where the originating address is no longer accessible, where, for example,
(1) CVC transfers originated from MEXC Global, but were held for an extended period of time in an unhosted wallet, or
(2) the covered financial institution’s risk mitigation procedures would preclude returning funds to MEXC Global. Moreover, by providing for the rejection of CVC, this order ensures that covered financial institutions will not be subject to an undue cost or burden associated with compliance."
此外，本命令不替代OFAC制裁、银行保密法义务，机构仍然需要上报SAR，遵守OFAC清单。对于故意违反该命令的实体，机构、高管、员工需承担民事罚款，甚至刑事处罚。
"E. Other Obligations Nothing in this order shall be construed to modify, impair, or otherwise affect any requirements or obligations to which a covered financial institution is subject pursuant to the BSA, including, but not limited to, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), or other applicable laws or regulations, such as the sanctions administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
F. Penalties for Noncompliance The covered financial institution, and any of its officers, directors, employees, and agents, may be liable for civil or criminal penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 for willfully violating this order."
结语
此次FinCEN通过第9714条发布命令切断MEXC与美国金融系统的联系，依据是MEXC被认定为与俄罗斯非法金融活动有关的一级洗钱关注对象，但命令正文的事实调查同时包含大量叠加伊朗、朝鲜、网络犯罪证据。对于虚拟资产服务提供商（VASPs）而言，构建区块链反洗钱系统，识别各类高风险平台及相关实体、评估钱包地址风险、分析虚拟资产流向已是VASP运营的必选项。
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